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Abstract
Cluster ensembles aim to find better, more
natural clusterings by combining multiple
clusterings. We apply ensemble clustering to
anomaly detection, hypothesizing that mul-
tiple views of the data will improve the de-
tection of attacks. Each clustering rates how
anomalous a point is; ratings are combined by
averaging or taking either the minimum, the
maximum, or median score. The evaluation
shows that taking the median prediction from
the cluster ensemble results in better perfor-
mance than single clusterings. Surprisingly,
averaging the individual predictions a) leads
to worse performance than that of individ-
ual clusterings, and b) performs identically
to taking the minimum prediction from the
ensemble. This counter-intuitive result stems
from asymmetric prediction distributions.
1. Introduction
Many data mining tasks involve looking for unusual,
novel, or atypical data patterns. In the literature vari-
ous names are given to the problem of finding “weird”
data: outlier detection, novelty detection, fraud de-
tection, anomaly detection, etc. Regardless of the do-
main, the interesting data for these tasks is typically
both rare and defined in contrast to normal data (i.e.
the interesting data is anything that is not normal).
We examine novelty detection in the context of
anomaly detection, a subtask for intrusion detec-
tion. Compared with misuse detection, where
known attacks are detected using hand crafted rules
and/or signatures, anomaly detection focuses on de-
tecting novel attacks. While current misuse detec-
tion systems achieve high detection rates with few or
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no false alarms, they are generally unable to detect
novel attacks. In contrast, anomaly detection relies
on models of ‘normal’ behavior and treats deviations
from the model as anomalies that are potential attacks.
While anomaly detection systems are able to detect
new, previously unseen attacks, they suffer from high
false alarm rates and the inability to identify the spe-
cific type of attack occurring (Ghosh & Schwartzbard,
1999). Typically misuse and anomaly detection are
used together.
For intrusion detection false alarm rate is as important
as detection rate. In practice, intrusion detection sys-
tems (IDSs) emit alarms that are checked by human
operators who determine if an alarm is valid and then
act accordingly. A high false alarm rate can overwhelm
operators and make the IDS unusable.
This paper investigates using an ensemble of cluster-
ings for anomaly detection. Recent research demon-
strates that ensemble clustering can combine mul-
tiple and varied clusterings into a superior consensus
clustering (Ayad & Kamel, 2003; Dudoit & Fridlyand,
2003; Fred & Jain, 2002; Hadjitodorov et al., 2005;
Leisch, 1999; Strehl & Ghosh, 2003; Topchy et al.,
2004). The concrete problem we consider is learn-
ing a model from historical network traffic (that is as-
sumed to be normal), and using the model to identify
anomalous patterns in new traffic. Our work is specif-
ically interested in whether cluster ensembles improve
anomaly detection performance (compared to single
clusterings). That is, do different viewpoints and con-
cepts of normalcy highlight the truly abnormal data
while reducing noise (false alarms)?
Our approach is to create hundreds of different clus-
terings of the known normal data using k-means clus-
tering (model building or training). When looking for
anomalies in new data (classification), each clustering
assigns a number in the range [0,1] to a data point that
represents how much the point does not fit the clus-
tering. The overall anomaly score is computed from
the individual scores assigned by each clustering.
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We evaluate the approach using the 1999 DARPA
/ Lincoln Laboratory Intrusion Detection Evaluation
(IDEVAL-1999) data, an established high quality syn-
thetic data set. The results show that combining
an ensemble of clusters can improve performance, de-
pending on how the individual scores are combined.
Surprisingly, averaging the individual scores (taking
the mean) performs worse than the expected perfor-
mance of an individual clustering for low false alarm
thresholds (the setting of most interest), while tak-
ing the median score convincingly outperforms the ex-
pected performance of a single clustering.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We sum-
marize related work in Section 2. Section 3 describes
our approach in detail. Experimental results and dis-
cussion follow in Sections 4 and 5; our conclusions are
in Section 6. A description of the IDEVAL-1999 data
set is in Appendix A.
2. Related Work
The defining characteristic of the anomaly detection
problem is the assumption that labeled attack data
is not available. Logically, it is impossible to antic-
ipate what new attacks will be developed. Multiple
approaches have been taken to address the lack of la-
beled attacks, including:
• Generating artificial attack data to train a super-
vised classifier (Ghosh & Schwartzbard, 1999; Lee
et al., 2001).
• Learning a model that fits available normal data
(or that could have generated the data). New
data points are assigned a statistical probability
of being generated by the model (Barbara´ et al.,
2001; Mahoney, 2003; Sekar et al., 2001).
• Clustering the data and looking for outliers or
atypical density patterns (e.g. an extremely dense
and isolated cluster may indicate a denial of ser-
vice attack) (Chan et al., 2003; Eskin et al., 2002;
Sequeira & Zaki, 2002). These methods do not re-
quire “normal” data. Indeed, they are sometimes
used as a way to remove anomalies from histori-
cal data to create a clean data set that is used in
learning a model of normal data patterns.
Fitting a model to the normal data works well if a good
model type can be found; the best-performing network
anomaly detectors fall into this paradigm. Often, how-
ever, the choice of model restricts the kind of attacks
that can be detected. (E.g. a finite state model of the
HTTP protocol cannot detect port scanning.)
Anomaly detection as a field has received increased re-
search attention following the two DARPA funded in-
trusion detection evaluation tests run by Lincoln Lab-
oratory in 1998 and 1999. Most of the undetected in-
trusion attacks in these evaluations were novel denial
of service attacks (DoS) and novel remote to local at-
tacks (basically privilege escalation). The seriousness
of these hard to detect attacks and the long analy-
sis time prior to adding signatures to misuse detec-
tion systems has led researchers to investigate several
models and techniques for anomaly detection, includ-
ing: neural networks (Ghosh & Schwartzbard, 1999),
rule learners such as RIPPER (Lee et al., 2001) and
LERAD (Chan et al., 2003; Mahoney & Chan, 2003),
finite state automata (Sekar et al., 2001; Sekar et al.,
2002), and immune-system inspired feature space cat-
egorization (Dasgupta & Gonza´lez, 2002). Statisti-
cal network anomaly detectors include Barbara´ et al.’s
Na¨ıve Bayes detector (2001) and Mahoney and Chan’s
PHAD (2001) and NETAD (2003) systems. Like this
work, PHAD and NETAD are trained using packet
header bytes. Both systems also incorporate informa-
tion about how much time passes between packets.
This information is an important factor in NETAD
achieving the best known performance on IDEVAL-
1999 data (132/185 attacks with 100 false alarms).
Our work is perhaps most comparable to CLAD, a
clustering network anomaly detector that builds fixed-
width, soft clusters in two passes. CLAD looks for
two kinds of anomalies: sparse clusters with few mem-
bers, and dense clusters that are far away from other
clusters (likely caused by flood attacks). At 100 false
alarms, CLAD detects 76/185 attacks in the IDEVAL-
1999 data (Chan et al., 2003).
Inspired by the successful application of ensem-
ble methods to supervised learning (esp. bag-
ging (Breiman, 1996)), researchers are now investigat-
ing ensemble clustering as a way to produce superior
clusterings (Leisch, 1999; Dudoit & Fridlyand, 2003;
Ayad & Kamel, 2003), reuse knowledge contained in
existing clusterings (Strehl & Ghosh, 2003), and es-
timate the confidence of cluster assignments (Dudoit
& Fridlyand, 2003). Leisch’s work on bagged clus-
tering (1999) provides a prototypical example: mul-
tiple clusterings are produced using k-means to clus-
ter bootstrap samples of the data set, which are then
combined into a consensus partitioning, or clustering,
by using hierarchical clustering to group the produced
centroids. Many different techniques have been pro-
posed for combining clusterings; most of them are
quadratic in the number of data points (making them
infeasible for this problem domain).
Despite the surge in interest, cluster ensembles are
not yet well understood. Hadjitodorov et al. (2005)
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present the counter-intuitive result that maximizing
ensemble diversity can reduce clustering accuracy.
Their results also hint that larger ensembles may also
hurt performance. This contrasts with Topchy et al.’s
proof that the consensus partition converges to a true
underlying partition as the number of clusterings in
the ensemble increases (Topchy et al., 2004).
Our work differs from previous ensemble clustering
work in that we do not combine clusterings to pro-
duce a consensus partitioning; instead we derive pre-
dictions from each clustering and combine them to im-
prove performance.
3. Approach
For each test point—a packet in our case—multiple
models predict if the point is normal or anomalous.
Within this general framework the following decisions
need to be made:
1. What do the individual models look like, and how
are they created?
2. What does a single prediction look like?
3. How are predictions combined?
We use clusterings as our models to avoid requiring
labeled attacks for training. It is worth noting that
although we build the models from clean data—data
that is free of attacks—the system does not require
this. An interesting future question is how well this
system performs when trained on dirty data.
The following subsections describe how our system an-
swers the above questions.
3.1. K-Means Clustering
K-means clustering is a widely used iterative cluster-
ing algorithm. Given k, the number of clusters to form,
Choose k initial cluster centers
(randomly in our case)
REPEAT
0. Remove all members from the clusters.
1. Assign each data point to closest cluster,
based on distance to its center.
2. Set each cluster center to the center of
mass of its members (i.e., the mean of the
members).
UNTIL clustering converges OR reach MAX_ITER
With each iteration the cluster centers move closer
to a natural clustering of the data. (See Pelleg and
Moore (1999) for a more efficient algorithm using kd-
trees that can be applied to low-dimensional data.)
For simplicity we use Euclidean distance as our dis-
tance measure and set MAX ITER to 100. In practice
MAX ITER rarely terminates the loop; most training
runs converge within 50 iterations.
To determine convergence, the fitness of the current
clustering is compared to the previous clustering’s fit-
ness. When the current clustering’s fitness is equal
to or worse than the previous, iterative refinement is
stopped. Fitness is measured using distortion, for
which k-means is known to converge to a local mini-
mum. Formally, the distortionφ of a clustering φ is
distortionφ =
1
N
∑
x
[d(x, φ(x))]2
whereN is the total number of points, x ranges over all
data points, and d(x, φ(x)) is the distance from x to its
assigned cluster centroid φ(x). Intuitively, optimizing
distortion minimizes the sum of squares for all x to
their centers, thereby fitting a clustering to the data.
Despite k-means’ simplicity, it works reasonably well.
Importantly, it trains in O(kN) time (compared with
other clustering algorithms with O(N2) training time).
We expect that most anomaly detection domains will
require a large data set to establish the ‘normal’ areas,
making quadratic clustering algorithms infeasible.
K-means does have a drawback. Specifically, it re-
quires choosing the value of k a priori. Typically, a
short parameter tuning experiment is run to find a
good value for k that results in reasonably good clus-
terings. Luckily the ensemble framework obviates the
need to perform this supervised optimization by letting
us combine votes from different k clusterings. This
not only means we do not have to run expensive ex-
periments to find k, but also allows the ensemble to
consider different granularity views of the data.1
3.2. Measuring Abnormality
Given a clustering the next question is how to classify
new points as normal or anomalous. Intuitively, ab-
normality is a continuous scale; point x1 can be more
or less anomalous. For anomaly detection it is desir-
able to assign every new point a score that rates how
anomalous the point is; a human expert can then fo-
cus investigations on the high scoring alarms that are
most likely to be attacks.
We define fringe factor as a measure of a point’s ab-
normality w.r.t. a clustering φ. Let c ∈ φ be the cluster
closest to a new point x (i.e. c’s centroid is the closest
centroid to x). Then ff(x), x’s fringe factor, is the per-
centage of c’s members that are closer to the centroid.
For example, if a cluster has 1,000 members and 337 of
1Indeed, our experiments find that the best k changes
with how many false alarms are allowed.
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them are closer to the centroid than x, ff(x) = 0.337.
Another point that lies wholly outside the cluster will
get a 1 since 100% of the cluster’s members are closer
to the centroid.2
3.3. Combining Predictions
Predictions from multiple clusterings are combined to
get an overall anomaly score that represents the con-
stituents’ combined point of view. We evaluate the sys-
tem using four combination methods: computing the
mean, taking the median prediction, taking the mini-
mum prediction, and taking the maximum prediction.
While averaging is the typical way to combine predic-
tions, the mean is less suited to asymmetric distribu-
tions. Figure 1 shows the distributions of fringe fac-
tor scores for some sample points from the IDEVAL-
1999 dataset. Most of the points, both anomalous and
normal, have skewed fringe factor distributions. Note
that the distributions are far more asymmetric than
they might first appear since the y-axes use a log scale
to make the graphs legible. Using the median as the
ensemble score is potentially more robust in this sit-
uation. The minimum score is the most conservative
prediction—all predictors agree that the point is at
least as anomalous as the minimum. Conversely, us-
ing the maximum score aggressively flags a point as
anomalous if any predictor thinks it is abnormal.
4. Evaluation
We evaluate cluster ensembles for anomaly detection
using the mean, the median, the min, and the max as
ways to combine fringe factor scores from individual
clusterings. All clusterings are built using the filtered
data from week 3. For each k in the range from 10
to 100 (increments of 10), 50 clusterings are built for
a total of 500 clusterings. The range of k was chosen
arbitrarily before looking at any data. Week 2 data
was used for testing during development. All results
are for testing on weeks 4 and 5.
4.1. Improvement from Cluster Ensemble
To determine if using an ensemble of clusters helps, we
compare the ensemble performances to the detection
performance of a single clustering. Unsurprisingly, k-
means’ tendency to find local minima results in cluster-
ings with vastly different performance. Consequently,
we define our baseline to be the expected performance
of a single clustering with the best k value. In other
2If the closest cluster has only a few points the ff scores
are very coarse. In our experiments the smallest clusters
have at least 200 points, making this a non-concern.
words, we average the performance of the single clus-
terings with the same k value (yielding 10 potential
baselines) and pick the best average. This approxi-
mates the performance one would get using a single
clustering when k has been selected using parameter
tuning data.
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Figure 2. Detections as a function of false alarm threshold.
Figure 2 shows the trade-off between false alarms and
detections. The x-axis is the false alarm threshold;
moving to the right increases the maximum number
of false alarms that can be tolerated. The y-axis is
the number of detections made at a given false alarm
threshold. Note that as the false alarm threshold
changes, the baseline picks averages from different k.3
For 100 false alarms (the traditional threshold for this
data set), max, mean, min, and median detect 5.1%
(8/157), 40.8% (64/157), 44.6% (70/157), and 44.6%
(70/157) of the attacks, respectively. The ensemble
performs better than the expected performance of a
single clustering for all combination methods except
max; the baseline detects 37.3% (58.5/157) of the at-
tacks. As Figure 2 shows, however, the difference be-
tween the combination methods is more striking than
these numbers suggest.
Two surprising observations can be made from Fig-
ure 2. First, mean performs much worse than
the baseline for low false alarm thresholds. This
is markedly different from how supervised ensemble
learning methods, such as bagging (Breiman, 1996),
usually improve performance—and almost never hurt
it. Interestingly, as the threshold increases mean does
steadily better, until it reliably performs better than
the baseline. Second, mean and min perform almost
identically at all false alarm thresholds. This is sur-
prising because it implies that mean is making conser-
vative predictions, and that its performance is strongly
3The optimal k tends to increase as the false alarm
threshold increases. For thresholds between 0 and 250,
the best k is either 20, 30, or 40.
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Figure 1. Fringe factor distribution from 500 clusterings for various packets. In each graph the frequency (y-axis) for each
fringe factor score (x-axis) is depicted. Note that the range varies for the x-axis, and that the y-axis uses a log scale. The
first 4 graphs correspond to anomalous packets; the remaining 6 are for non-attack packets. 2364: detected by median.
3379: detected by mean and median. 115627/277491: detected by neither mean nor median. 8171, 8545, 20819: low
ranked normal packets. 19937: false alarm for median. 205557: false alarm for mean and median. 490760: false alarm
for mean.
influenced by the lowest fringe factor scores.
median, on the other hand, outperforms the baseline
at all but the lowest false alarm thresholds. Given that
low outlier scores appear to strongly impact mean, it
is not surprising that median—which should be robust
to asymmetric outliers—performs well.
Finally, max performs poorly. This suggests that there
is a lot of noise in the highest score for the data points.
In other words, most any point can look anomalous to
at least one of the clusterings. This underlines the risk
associated with using a single clustering. Combining
multiple clusterings is a natural way to overcome the
large variation in individual performances.
Beyond 500 false alarms performance plateaus with all
methods (except max) detecting around 120 attacks,
and attack detections become increasingly lost among
the false alarms.
In summary, our results indicate that combining clus-
terings improves performance if the fringe factors are
combined using the median. Averaging the individ-
ual predictions hurts performance unless a high false
alarm threshold is used.
5. Discussion
In this section we investigate more closely why averag-
ing individual predictions leads to below average per-
formance for false alarm thresholds below 100. For
mean to perform worse than the baseline, averaging
must be promoting high ranking false alarms over true
attacks. Consider the following scenario. Each indi-
vidual clustering ranks a true attack first, followed by
3 false alarms. If the top attacks are all different and
the false alarms are the same (across clusterings), then
averaging the fringe factors will move the false alarms
ahead of all the detections.
The above scenario is particularly likely if there are
outliers in the distribution of the fringe factors. A
handful of outlying scores that occur at the tail-end
of an asymmetric disribution can strongly influence
the distribution’s mean. The fact that the median, a
combiner that is more resistant to outliers and skewed
distributions, outperforms the mean and the baseline
is evidence that outliers are detrimentally affecting the
mean.
Figure 1 shows sample score distributions for attack
and normal packets. It is clear that most packets,
particularly the attacks and false alarms, have skewed
score distributions that make the mean unreliable. It is
also interesting that the profile for the normal packets
varies a great deal.
We also note that the graphs support the observation
that anomaly detection is difficult: there is virtually
no difference between some of the attacks and some of
the false alarms. This suggests that the features we
use do not sufficiently capture the difference between
anomalous and normal data.
If the problem with averaging the scores is outliers, as
it appears to be, then using the nth percentile score is
a way to ignore different percentages of outliers. Fig-
ure 3 plots the detection rate as a function of which
percentile score is chosen to represent the cluster en-
semble. For example, taking percentiles 0.0, 0.5, and
1.0 correspond to using the minimum score, the me-
dian score, and the maximum score, respectively. Per-
formance is shown for different false alarm thresholds.
For low false alarm thresholds, the best percentile is
either 0.4 or 0.5. At higher thresholds the percentile
used matters less, with the caveat that 1.0 always per-
Cluster Ensembles for Network Anomaly Detection
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
# 
de
te
ct
io
ns
percentile model chosen
300 false alarms
200 false alarms
150 false alarms
100 false alarms
50 false alarms
25 false alarms
Figure 3. Attack detections as a function of percentile
model chosen.
forms poorly. The graph supports our hypothesis that
extreme scores, especially at the high end, are unreli-
able and noisy.
More generally, these results raise the question of
whether supervised ensemble learning methods, such
as bagging (Breiman, 1996), can yield better results
by combining model predictions using the median in-
stead of the mean. While it could be difficult to change
merging techniques from one test point to another, al-
ways using the median could be beneficial for certain
data sets. This seems particularly likely if the data set
exhibits the same asymmetric prediction distributions
as our work has found for network anomaly detection.
6. Conclusions
We investigate using cluster ensembles for anomaly de-
tection, reasoning that multiple views of the data can
better highlight atypical points. To measure abnor-
mality, we define fringe factor as a score of how much
a point is on the fringe of its assigned cluster. Our
experiments test merging the fringe factor scores from
each clustering using the mean, the median score, the
minimum score, and the maximum.
We find that the interesting data—attacks and false
alarms—have a skewed distribution of scores. As a
result, the cluster ensemble that merges predictions
using the mean performs worse than the expected sin-
gle clustering performance—unless many false alarms
are allowed. Taking the median, however, reliably
improves upon single clustering performance. Using
the minimum performs almost identically to the mean,
while using the maximum yields very bad performance.
In the future we hope to apply ensemble clustering to
other novelty detection problems. Another interest-
ing question is whether supervised ensemble learning
methods can benefit from using the median to merge
predictions instead of the mean, and under what cir-
cumstances.
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A. Anomaly Dataset
We evaluate our work using the 1999 DARPA/Lincoln
Laboratory Intrusion Detection Evaluation (IDEVAL-
1999) data, specifically the tcpdump data from a packet
sniffer inside the router (the inside packet trace). The
dataset contains three weeks of training data and two
weeks of test data. Weeks two, four, and five contain
denial of service (DoS) attacks, probes (e.g. port
scans), remote to local (R2L) attacks where remote
access is elevated to local user privileges, user to root
(U2R) attacks where local user privileges are elevated
to root privileges, and data attacks where proprietary
data is released accidentally or maliciously by an em-
ployee. Since the data sets were created by simulation,
the test data does not contain unknown, unlabeled
attacks. Scoring during the original evaluation was
based on the number of attacks detected while con-
strained to 10 false alarms per day of training data;
a detection needed to be supported by identifying the
IP address of the attack target.
A stated goal of the evaluation was to test the ability
of systems to detect novel attacks. To this end, several
attacks in the test data were not present in the training
data. Out of 201 total attacks, 35 were stealthy ver-
sions of attacks used in the 1998 Intrusion Detection
Evaluation (IDEVAL-1998) and 62 were new attacks
developed for the evaluation. The systems participat-
ing in the evaluation detected, on average, 72% of the
old attacks but only 19% of the new/stealthy attacks.
Lippmann et al.’s report of the evaluation (2000) lists
21 attack types (out of a 56 total attack types) that
were poorly detected by all systems regardless of the
false alarm rate.
While there are 201 attacks present in IDEVAL-1999’s
test data, not all of these attacks are detectable from
the inside packet trace dataset. As a result, much
of the research using these data sets calculates the
percentage detected out of those attacks that could
conceivably be detected. For example, the inside net-
work trace only contains evidence for about 177 attack
events. Since each work tends to define the detectable
attacks slightly differently (e.g. based on whether or
not network traffic outside the router was examined
some attacks were or were not detectable; some sys-
tems only targeted certain attack types; etc.) com-
parisons based on percentages of attacks detected are
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not straightforward. Often the number of attack de-
tections, when 10 false alarms per day are allowed,
are reported. This works out to 100 false alarms for
the two week test period. (Data was not provided for
Saturdays or Sundays.)
The IDEVAL-1999 data is not labeled in the tradi-
tional sense. Based on experience with the previous
evaluation (IDEVAL-1998), the organizers felt that la-
beling every single packet as attack / non-attack was
too time consuming, difficult, and error prone. In-
stead, IDEVAL-1999 comes with a list of attacks, the
times at which they occur, and the IP addresses in-
volved (source and destination). To allow for small
inconsistencies in host clocks, any alarm with the cor-
rect destination IP address and an attack time that
falls within plus or minus 60 seconds of the attack
time is considered a positive detection. An impor-
tant consequence of this evaluation scheme is that nor-
mal packet traffic occurring within an attack’s window
and headed to the attack’s target is effectively labeled
as anomalous. Short of manually examining packets,
there is no way to know how many normal packets fall
within these windows. Nonetheless, we use IDEVAL-
1999 since it is the best available data set.
Since many attacks are identifiable—rightly or
wrongly—by multiple packets, multiple positive
alarms within the window are treated as one positive
detection to make the detection counts understand-
able. False alarms are not accorded the same privi-
lege. As a result false alarms accumulate very quickly.
Most research using this dataset compensates by lim-
iting the rate of alarms. We follow Mahoney (2003)
in filtering the alarms emitted by the system to keep
only the highest scored (most anomalous) alarm for
each minute. In our experience this substantially im-
proves the system’s detection rate.
A.1. Feature Representations
Following Mahoney (2003), we use the first 48 bytes of
the packet, starting with the IP header, for the train-
ing features. Each feature corresponds to one byte.
For TCP data the features include the IP header, the
TCP header, and a few bytes of the data payload. For
simplicity we have chosen to not interpret the header
bytes. For example, no effort is made to treat bytes
12-15 (the source IP address) of TCP data as a sin-
gle number or to combine the two bytes comprising
the destination port into a single number. This saves
us from actively interpreting different protocols when
processing data (e.g. web traffic, email, DNS updates,
etc.). Such higher level interpretation would be desir-
able in a more complete implementation. Mahoney
achieves good performance using the same uninter-
preted features and a feature that approximated the
passage of time.4
Logically, these byte-based feature vectors seem like a
poor fit with a Euclidean distance measure. To see
this, note that packet fields are almost universally dis-
crete. Considering only the destination port, port 79
is logically no closer to port 80 than port 23 or port
50,000 (ignoring reserved port designations). The Eu-
clidean distance metric, however, treats these values
as continuous and places undue emphasis on numeric
separation.
To address this we transform the feature values into a
frequency space using the technique Chan et al. em-
ploy for CLAD (2003), which we motivate below. To
make the values continuous, a given value vf for a fea-
ture f is replaced by the frequency with which that
value occurs for that feature in the training data. In-
tuitively this can be seen as estimating the probability
of vf occurring based on the distribution of values ob-
served during training. (The frequency values could
be normalized by the number of training instances to
get a real probability; we have not done so since we do
not require the values to be in the range [0,1].)
Within the frequency space of the transformed val-
ues, every feature will necessarily have a power law
distribution with larger values (those with high fre-
quency before transformation) occurring much more
frequently than other values. The distance between
two instances could potentially be dominated by one
feature with very different values. We mitigate this
effect by using a log scale in the frequency space.
Even using the log scale, there is still the problem that
between features the range of observed values is differ-
ent. For example, feature one may range from 0 to
10, while feature two ranges from 0 to 5. As a result,
feature one is implicitly given more weight than fea-
ture two by Euclidean distance since larger distances
are possible in feature one than in feature two. We re-
move this implicit weighting by normalizing a feature’s
4Mahoney and Chan (2001; 2003) discovered a simula-
tion artifact in the IDEVAL-1999 data set where the time-
to-live (TTL) field of packets during training was limited
to only 8 values. In contrast, 80 distinct values were ob-
served by the authors during a 9 hour period on their de-
partment web server. Consequently the values of 126 and
253 that only occur in the IDEVAL-1999 test data allow
PHAD (Mahoney & Chan, 2001) to detect 33 attacks (19
different types) and cause 20 false alarms. This indicates
that unless the TTL field is ignored by anomaly detection
systems, performance may be artificially inflated on the
IDEVAL-1999 data set. Following them we zero out the
TTL field in the data.
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values by the range of the feature.
Formally we can express the transformation T as,
T (vf ) = RangeNormalize(ln(bvfc+ 1), f)
where
RangeNormalize(l, f) = (l −minf )/(maxf −minf )
A.2. Filtering
Following Mahoney (2003) we have filtered the packet
stream to reduce the data size and remove noise. Our
filtering is closely based on Mahoney’s, but differs in
that we do not rate limit new TCP connections to 16
per 60 seconds and we do not remove UDP packets to
ports > 1023. In more detail,
1. Non-IP packets (address resolution protocol
(ARP), hub test, etc.) are removed. This focuses
our modeling on the most likely attack space. Ide-
ally non-IP traffic would be modeled in a sepa-
rate clustering. For evaluation purposes this is
not possible since identifying attacks requires giv-
ing the IP address of the attack target, and this
information is not available from non-IP packets
alone. The filter actually removes all IP pack-
ets that are not TCP or user datagram protocol
(UDP) traffic as well. In practice though the only
IP packets in the data are TCP and UDP packets.
2. Outgoing traffic is removed. This choice was made
simply to limit the size of the data. Most of the
attacks are not in the outgoing traffic at any rate.
3. TCP packets that do not open new connec-
tions are removed. This includes acknowledgment
packets (ACK’s), goodbye packets (FIN’s), and
packets containing data after the first 100 bytes
(determined using the sequence number). Con-
nections are hashed to a 4K hash table using
their addresses and ports (both source and des-
tination). The rationale is to try and model TCP
data as a series of connections and not as discrete
packets. While tracking the normalcy of the data
payloads can be very powerful, it is very hard
to generalize to a small model. Furthermore, a
significant portion of today’s traffic is encrypted,
making the data segment of packets useless.
4. All remaining packets are truncated to 48 bytes,
starting at the beginning of the IP packet (i.e. the
Ethernet header is discarded).
Filtering keeps 241,173 of 10,814,374 packets for week
3 and reduces the size of the data files from 2.06 GB
to 11 MB. Reductions for the other weeks are similar.
The obvious concern with filtering is that interesting
data—attacks—might be removed. To determine the
maximum number of detectable attacks remaining in
the data, we output an alarm for every packet in the
test data and find that 157/177 attacks are detected.
Thus, filtering only removes evidence for 20 attacks.
